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_________________ 
DEBATE 
_________________ 
DEMOCRACY, POLITICAL IGNORANCE, AND  
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 
In this Debate, Professors Ilya Somin and Sanford Levinson dis-
cuss the constitutional implications of a federal government whose 
“size, scope, and complexity” are far beyond anything that the framers 
could have possibly imagined and an electorate that is more likely to 
be able to name the Three Stooges than the three branches of their 
government.  Both professors agree that the situation is problematic 
for our democratic form of government and that concerted efforts 
could—and should—be taken to alleviate the problem.  As to what 
those steps should be, they offer two very different solutions. 
Professor Somin begins by agreeing with critics of the U.S. Consti-
tution, such as Professor Levinson, that “our present constitutional sys-
tem has significant flaws.”  He worries, however, that constitutional re-
forms made in the midst of widespread political ignorance carry no 
guarantee of establishing anything better.  Instead, Professor Somin 
advocates addressing the problem by “reduc[ing] the overweening 
power of government over society.”  Although large-scale reductions 
are unlikely in the short term, he asserts that the process can begin by 
“reestablish[ing] constitutional limits on government power that have 
eroded over the last several decades.” 
Professor Levinson argues, however, that a return to a radically 
smaller replublic is simply not plausible and efforts to effect such 
change are akin to “swimming upstream, perhaps against a waterfall.”  
We would be better served, he believes, by adapting our Constitution 
to match the complexity of the modern state.  Through an increase in 
the number of U.S. senators and representatives, a decrease in the 
time between the election and inauguration of a new President, and a 
reduction in the “full-life” tenure of Supreme Court Justices, Professor 
Levinson contends that our Constitution can be adapted to take sig-
nificant steps toward achieving a “more perfect Union.” 
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Ilya Somin
†
 
In Federalist No. 62, James Madison warned that “[i]t will be of little 
avail to the people, that the laws are made by men of their own 
choice, if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so 
incoherent that they cannot be understood.”  THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, 
at 381 ( James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  Unfortunately, 
the dangerous state of affairs Madison warned against has come to 
pass.  The size, scope, and complexity of American government have 
grown so great that it is often impossible for the electorate to acquire 
enough knowledge to exercise meaningful democratic control. 
Critics of the U.S. Constitution have long argued that it isn’t suffi-
ciently democratic.  My partner in this exchange, Professor Sanford 
Levinson is one of the leading modern advocates of this view.  I agree 
with him that our present constitutional system has significant flaws.  
At the same time, however, I am skeptical that constitutional reform is 
likely to alleviate the most important factor undermining democracy 
in our political system:  widespread political ignorance exacerbated by 
the enormous size and scope of modern government.  Political igno-
rance also reduces the chance that we can successfully enact other 
constitutional reforms that might improve the system without neces-
sarily making it more democratic.  The situation is not entirely hope-
less, but I am skeptical that radical improvements in the constitutional 
structure can be achieved in the near future. 
THE POLITICS OF IGNORANCE 
Democratic control of American government is severely weakened 
by widespread political ignorance.  Yet even a significantly more atten-
tive public than the one we currently have is unlikely to acquire ade-
quate knowledge of more than a fraction of the government’s wide-
ranging activities. 
For decades, public opinion researchers have found very low levels 
of public knowledge on a variety of issues.  For example, in a survey 
taken a few months before the 2004 election, over seventy percent of 
the public did not realize that Congress had passed President George 
W. Bush’s prescription drug plan, the largest new federal program in 
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decades.
1
  Only thirty-two percent know that Social Security is one of 
the two largest items in the federal budget.
2
  More recently, pluralities 
of the public believed that WMDs had been found in Iraq long after 
the failure to find them became clear.
3
 
The public is also often ignorant of basic structural facts about the 
political system.  A 2006 Zogby poll showed that only forty-two percent 
can name the three branches of the federal government.
4
  Similarly, 
about half of the public believes that the President has the power to 
suspend the Constitution,
5
 and only twenty-eight percent can name 
two or more of the five rights protected by the First Amendment.
6
 
Not only are citizens often ignorant of basic information, they also 
routinely do a poor job of evaluating the knowledge that they do have.  
Studies repeatedly show that voters evaluate political information in 
much the same way that sports fans evaluate information about their 
favorite team:  they overvalue information that makes their side look 
good and discount data that cuts the other way. 
Public ignorance and irrationality about politics is not accidental 
or merely the result of stupidity.  Political ignorance is in fact rational 
behavior.  Since there is only an infinitesimally small chance that any 
one vote will affect the outcome of an election, it is rational for most 
voters to devote little or no time to acquiring information that would 
improve their chances of picking the right candidate or party.  It is 
also rational for them to be illogical in their evaluation of the knowl-
edge that they do possess.  Since there is little incentive to acquire po-
litical knowledge purely for the sake of being a better voter, most 
knowledge is acquired for other reasons, including the pleasure of 
rooting for one’s preferred political “team” or having one’s biases 
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confirmed.  Unbiased evaluation of evidence gets in the way of these 
objectives and so most of us don’t try very hard to control those biases. 
The size and scope of modern government ensures that even a 
much higher level of knowledge might not be sufficient to ensure 
democratic control of government.  Government spending accounts 
for some thirty-seven percent of the U.S. GDP, and that figure pre-
dates the recent massive bailout and stimulus bills.  USGovern-
mentSpending.com, U.S. Government Spending as Percent of GDP, 
http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/us_20th_century_chart.html 
(last visited Mar. 15, 2009). 
The government also extensively regulates most aspects of our 
lives.  Even a relatively well-informed public is unlikely to know about 
much more than a fraction of this government activity.  Similarly, it is 
doubtful that most voters actually understand the contents of the re-
cently enacted stimulus bill. 
There are many different normative theories of democratic par-
ticipation, and some demand higher levels of public knowledge than 
others.  But even the relatively undemanding ones require greater 
knowledge than most of the public possesses.  For example, advocates 
of “retrospective voting” believe that the public merely needs to know 
enough to toss out incumbents when they are performing badly.  But 
this implies that the public should know which government officials 
are responsible for what issues and how effective their policies have 
been relative to the available alternatives.  The public usually votes 
against incumbents during economic downturns and for them in 
times of prosperity.  This heuristic ignores the possibility that a reces-
sion would have been even worse under alternative policies or a pe-
riod of prosperity even better.  Simple-minded attribution of the status 
quo to incumbents leads voters to systematically make foolish mistakes 
such as voting against incumbent governors in farm states during 
times when crop production is depressed by weather.  Christopher H. 
Achen & Larry M. Bartels, Blind Retrospection:  Electoral Responses 
to Drought, Flu, and Shark Attacks 20-29 ( Jan. 27, 2004) (unpub-
lished manuscript), available at http://www.international.ucla.edu/ 
media/files/PERG.Achen.pdf. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 
The reality of widespread political ignorance and irrationality has 
important implications for constitutional reform intended to make 
government more democratic.  One is that we are unlikely to greatly 
strengthen democratic control of government without reducing the 
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knowledge burden imposed on voters by the size and scope of the 
modern state. 
A second and even more pessimistic implication is that political 
ignorance might well influence the content of constitutional change 
for the worse.  Under modern conditions, any amendment process 
would require broad public participation to have legitimacy.  This 
gives political leaders opportunities to manipulate public opinion to 
approve constitutional change that benefits narrow interest groups at 
the expense of the general public or otherwise causes more harm 
than good.  Such manipulation is particularly likely in a time of crisis 
like the present, when the combination of fear and ignorance might 
lead the public to approve dangerous policies sold as “emergency” 
measures.  Many liberal scholars believe, with some justification, that 
this is exactly what happened in the case of policies that imposed ex-
cessive restrictions on civil liberties in the aftermath of 9/11.  In my 
scholarship on the 1930s, I presented evidence that the economic cri-
sis of the Great Depression allowed political leaders to exploit public 
ignorance to build support for similarly dubious emergency policies.  
Ilya Somin, Voter Knowledge and Constitutional Change:  Assessing the New 
Deal Experience, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 595 (2003).  For example, the 
Agriculture Adjustment Act of 1938, familiar to law students because it 
was upheld in the famous Supreme Court case of Wickard v. Filburn, 
317 U.S. 111 (1942), artificially increased food prices at a time when 
widespread economic hardship had already brought many of the poor 
to the brink of malnutrition.  During World War II, the public over-
whelmingly supported President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s decision to 
intern over 150,000 Japanese-Americans, in part because the public 
was ignorant of the reality that they posed little or no security threat. 
Public ignorance helped ensure the enactment of these dubious 
emergency policies despite the fact that many of them arguably vio-
lated the existing Constitution.  Opening the door to large-scale al-
teration of the Constitution itself could potentially be even more dan-
gerous, since it does away with the admittedly imperfect constraint 
imposed by judicial review that can sometimes strike down govern-
ment overreaching as a violation of the current Constitution. 
Although the existing Constitution has important shortcomings, 
there is no guarantee that we will end up with a better one if we open 
the door to large-scale revision during a time of crisis. 
This in turn brings us to the issue of whether the U.S. Constitu-
tion should be made easier to amend.  One of the most common 
criticisms of the U.S. Constitution is that it is undemocratic because it 
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is too difficult to amend.  Generally speaking, Article V of the Consti-
tution requires that an amendment have two-thirds support in each 
house of Congress and also get the support of three quarters of state 
legislatures.  As a practical matter, this makes it almost impossible to 
enact any major amendment.  A small minority can potentially stymie 
an amendment favored by a large majority.  Scholars such as Akhil 
Amar, Bruce Ackerman, and Professor Levinson have all argued for 
allowing revisions to the Constitution without going through the Arti-
cle V process. 
I agree with Professor Levinson and other critics that Article V is 
too restrictive.  However, the problem of political ignorance should 
lead us to tread warily in circumventing it.  By requiring a large su-
permajority for a constitutional amendment, Article V makes it diffi-
cult to change the Constitution by manipulating political ignorance 
during a crisis.  In order to pass, an Article V amendment needs to 
have strong support from the knowledgeable minority of voters as well 
as from the relatively ignorant majority.  We may still wish to change 
Article V (as I believe we should).  But any alternative amendment 
mechanism should still require a broad supermajority in order to pro-
tect against the manipulation of political ignorance, as well as other 
dangers. 
Obviously, these concerns could be set aside if the status quo Con-
stitution were so abysmal that almost any reasonable alternative would 
be better.  However, it is important to remember that the United 
States remains one of the most successful polities in the world.  We 
have a higher standard of living than any other major nation, and 
have remained a magnet for immigrants from all over the world.  
Compared to Western European and Asian democracies, we have 
been more successful than most in integrating large numbers of peo-
ple from many different backgrounds into the mainstream of our so-
ciety.  On the foreign policy front, we have successfully overcome the 
challenge of fascism and communism and—despite the errors of the 
Bush administration—will likely prevail in the present battle against 
radical Islamism.  I say all this not to excuse the many shortcomings of 
the U.S. political system but to emphasize that things could be a lot 
worse, especially in a situation where the content of any radical reform 
would be heavily influenced by political ignorance. 
WHAT IS TO BE DONE? 
In conclusion, I ask the same question Lenin posed in his epony-
mous 1902 book.  Lenin, too, was frustrated by widespread political 
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ignorance and believed that the only way forward was to concentrate 
political power in the hands of a well-informed political elite—the 
“vanguard” later known as the Communist Party.  In our time, some 
scholars who recognize the dangers of political ignorance advocate far 
more modest versions of Lenin’s solution, arguing for increasing the 
authority of expert administrators insulated from the political process.  
Cass Sunstein and Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer are two of 
the best known. 
I am skeptical of the desirability of elite-led governance. Thus, I 
would prefer to address the problem of political ignorance by reduc-
ing the size and scope of government altogether, thereby narrowing 
the range of decisions that will be influenced by the rational igno-
rance of voters without at the same time concentrating power in the 
hands of a small elite.  I realize, however, that large-scale reductions in 
the size of government are unlikely in the near future.  We are, in fact, 
more likely to see continued large-scale expansions of its power. 
Thus, I urge a more modest reform program.  Where possible, we 
should work to reestablish constitutional limits on government power 
that have eroded over the last several decades.  For example, it is 
probably impossible and undesirable to fully roll back the massive 
regulatory state established since the New Deal.  But it may be feasible 
to modify or overrule decisions such as Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 
(2005), which give Congress essentially unlimited authority to regulate 
almost any activity.  When the present crisis abates, it may become po-
litically feasible to promote reductions in the size and scope of Ameri-
can government, as occurred in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Political ignorance and its impact on democracy are far from the 
only factors that we must take account of in considering the appropri-
ate role of government in society.  But they deserve greater attention 
than they have received so far. 
Even more modestly, advocates of constitutional reform should be 
aware of the challenges posed by political ignorance and the limits it 
places on our ability to make the constitution more democratic. 
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There is obviously much to agree with in Professor Somin’s Open-
ing Statement.  Begin only with the fact that it is certainly true that 
modern government is almost infinitely more complex than anything 
that was likely to be conceivable to the framers of the 1787 Constitu-
tion.  The ubiquity of the “modern administrative state,” for starters, 
would have been as mysterious a notion as the development of an air 
force to complement the constitutionally stipulated army and naval 
forces.  When John Adams moved the national government from 
Philadelphia to Washington in May 1800, there were apparently only 
about 125 employees for the entire federal government.  Anyone who 
has physically observed the shelf space taken by early copies of the 
Public Laws of the United States (or, for that matter, of the Supreme 
Court Reports) knows how much more one can plausibly be said to 
“need to know” in order to be on top of modern government.  In-
deed, one need not even compare the present against two centuries 
ago.  The Congress of only a half-century ago was scarcely, if at all, 
concerned with health, education, or environmental policy, even 
though that would change soon enough with the arrival of the Ken-
nedy, Johnson, and, lest we forget, the Nixon administrations.  And, 
for what it is worth, we might note as well that the “United States” 
conceptualized in 1787 included roughly three million people living 
in territory extending southward from what is now Maine to the 
southern border of Georgia, and westward to the east bank of the Mis-
sissippi River.  There are so many ways that the modern American pol-
ity differs from anything imagined (or even imaginable) in 1787! 
Perhaps we should really be debating whether Madison was actu-
ally correct in Federalist Nos. 10 and 14 in defending the possibility of 
an “extended republic,” as against the far smaller (and more homo-
geneous) vision of republican government held by such eminent po-
litical theorists as Montesquieu and, in many ways, Jefferson.  After all, 
when Professor Somin brings up the well-known and much discussed 
“irrationality” of engaging oneself politically, including paying the 
significant costs in getting information relevant to having an informed 
opinion about a complex issue of public policy, he is implicitly agree-
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ing that the “extended” republic simply makes it more and more ra-
tional in effect to drop out—to tend one’s garden or pursue other 
purely “private” interests—rather than participate as literally one 
among many millions in elections where there is no practical possibil-
ity that one’s vote will “matter” in anything other than a civil religious 
sense involving the satisfaction one takes personally when participat-
ing in a civic ritual. 
But we live in the world we do, and there is no plausible narrative 
that has us turning back to an earlier world.  We will not return to a 
smaller republic, whether that be defined simply spatially—i.e., a 
United States made smaller by the breakup into several separate coun-
tries—or by reference to the scope of issues that are viewed as a le-
gitimate part of the political agenda.  For good or for ill, the last elec-
tion, and the present atmosphere of “crisis,” both domestic and 
international, economic and more conventional national security, as-
sures that ever more governmental regulation—and, therefore, added 
complexity—is in our future.  If we demand anything approaching a 
sophisticated knowledge of the issues as a condition for the kind of 
civic deliberation linked with the notion of a “Republican Form of 
Government” envisioned by the Constitution, we might well be con-
demned as hopelessly quixotic and utopian. 
These are not happy times for anyone who takes seriously the no-
tion of a “Republican Form of Government,” which in the modern 
world must translate into some reasonably robust form of “democ-
racy”—i.e., decision making that in some meaningful sense is trace-
able to the public in whose name the government acts.  After all, the 
United States, under Presidents of both of the major parties, has de-
clared itself committed to the goal of spreading democracy around 
the world.  The deep undercurrent of Professor Somin’s comments 
challenge the meaningfulness, or perhaps even wisdom, of this goal 
given the widespread ignorance that he identifies.  And there is surely 
little reason to have greater optimism about most other countries, 
even if some specific ones (perhaps Iceland or Sweden) might score 
significantly higher in relevant public knowledge. 
So we must wrestle with the phenomenon of the “widespread po-
litical ignorance” that is indeed our present condition.  Part of the 
problem may be general American culture.  Former Justice Sandra 
Day O’Connor has recently complained that “[t]wo-thirds of Ameri-
cans know at least one of the judges on the Fox TV show American Idol, 
but less than one in ten can name the Chief Justice of the United 
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States Supreme Court.”
7
  She might easily have also cited an August 
2006 Zogby Poll that found that three times as many Americans could 
name two of the Seven Dwarfs as could name an equal number of Su-
preme Court Justices (seventy-seven percent as against twenty-four 
percent).
8
  Professor Somin notes the Zogby Poll indicating that forty-
two percent could name the three main branches of the national gov-
ernment; consider the fact that almost three-quarters of Americans 
can rattle off the names of the Three Stooges (Larry, Curly, and 
Moe).
9
  Even if one doubts the particular importance of knowing fac-
toids like the names of the Justices, one might still be perturbed by 
the abysmal ignorance about the most basic structural features of our 
political system. 
So what are the implications of these facts for anyone who bewails 
the current state of the American constitutional republic, as I do, and 
advocates significant structural changes?  “One,” says Professor Somin, 
“is that we are unlikely to greatly strengthen democratic control of 
government without reducing the knowledge burden imposed on vot-
ers by the size and scope of the modern state.”  I am reminded here of 
Madison’s reminder in Federalist No. 10 that we could eliminate the 
problem of “faction” by suppressing the “liberty” that inevitably gen-
erates “faction”; but, as he says, the cure would be worse than the dis-
ease.  Thus his concern is with trying to imagine a government that at 
one and the same time protects liberty and controls the more adverse 
consequences of the faction that will accompany it.  So the challenge 
facing the modern designer is trying to imagine a more truly democ-
ratic (or “Republican Form of”) government in a modern world that 
will most definitely not reduce the burdens imposed on participants. 
Basically, Professor Somin offers a counsel of despair.  His condi-
tion precedent for even thinking about constitutional change is a 
radical transformation of American political culture that would seem-
ingly require, for starters, the undoing of the New Deal and returning 
to the more pristine vision of, say, President Calvin Coolidge.  That I 
disagree with him in his assessment of what would be desirable is be-
side the point, for there is simply no possibility of the condition being 
met.  So then he concludes, in effect, that because truly radical 
change is unlikely, we should rather supinely accept the constitutional 
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status quo (in the sense of the set of institutions bequeathed us by the 
framers), in spite of his acknowledgment of “the many shortcomings 
of the U.S. political system.”  But it’s not so broken that we should 
take the risks of changing it, given the widespread popular ignorance 
and concomitant susceptibility to demagogic argument. 
But even if one accepts the reality of popular ignorance and the 
plausibility of the fears expressed by Professor Somin, are we really re-
quired to keep everything as it is rather than open the Pandora’s Box of 
constitutional reform at all?  My own desires are for extensive change.  
I would eliminate equal voting power in the Senate tomorrow; there is 
no justification for two senators from Maine being equal in power to 
the two senators from California or, for that matter, Texas.  Indeed, 
like Larry Sabato, I would inject into the Senate a more “national” 
perspective by having at least some number of senators who did not 
come from geographically delimited areas at all.  I recognize, how-
ever, that these hopes may be as utopian and quixotic as Professor 
Somin’s call for returning to the good old days of the 1920s. 
But what about more modest changes?  Consider the remarkably 
increased workload facing the modern Congress because of the en-
hanced agenda over the last half-century.  As it happens, the House 
and Senate assumed their present size in 1959, when Hawaii became 
the fiftieth state to join the Union.  Might it not make very good sense, 
as advocated by University of Virginia political scientist Larry Sabato, 
to increase the size of both institutions?  Take only the Senate.  Even if 
one is forced to stick with the equal allocation of voting power, how-
ever objectionable it may be, why not elect three senators from each 
state rather than two?  Wouldn’t that make it at least marginally more 
likely that there would be at least some senators who would be more 
knowledgeable than is currently the case about the ever-more com-
plex issues of public policy facing the Senate.  One might hesitate to 
change the size of the House from 435 to, say, 535; even now, there is 
no possibility for genuine debate in the House, but it is worth asking if 
the gains of increased membership might outweigh the costs. 
Similarly, I see no reason why we might not emulate the framers 
of the 20th Amendment by shortening the dysfunctional extended 
hiatus between election and inauguration of a new President.  Prior to 
the 20th Amendment, proposed and adopted in 1933, a new president 
wasn’t inaugurated until March 4th; the Amendment changed it to 
January 20th.  That’s still too long a hiatus in the world we now live in.  
To be sure, further shortening at some point would necessarily re-
quire us to confront as well the Electoral College, a topic I have de-
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bated earlier in this forum with Professors Daniel Lowenstein and 
John McGinness.  Sanford Levinson, Daniel H. Lowenstein & John 
McGinnis, Should We Dispense with the Electoral College?, Debate, 156 U. 
PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 10 (2007), http://www.pennumbra.com/ 
debates/pdfs/electoral_college.pdf. 
Or consider a recent proposal drafted by Professors Paul Carring-
ton of Duke and Roger Cramton of Cornell that would attempt to rein 
in the “full-life” tenure of Justices of the United States Supreme Court 
and replace it with de facto eighteen-year terms.  Is this proposal, or 
any of the ones mentioned above, to be ruled off the table of contem-
porary American politics?  Is there nothing about the present Constitu-
tion that “We the People,” even in our present state of ignorance, ra-
tional or otherwise, could not meaningfully address in our hopes to 
achieve a “more perfect Union”? 
I fear that the message of Professor Somin’s essay is that we really 
should give up on the democratic experiment itself, that it has simply 
been overtaken by the conjoined events of a too-large and overreach-
ing polity.  That is an interesting and important argument, and it may 
even be correct.  But he should then address more fully what sort of 
government we should realistically aspire to in the twenty-first century 
in the absence of the radical political and cultural shifts he might have 
as his first-order preference.  I look forward to his reply. 
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CLOSING STATEMENT 
Ilya Somin 
I would like to thank Professor Levinson for his insightful and 
thought-provoking reply to my initial essay.  There are important points 
of common ground between us.  In particular, we seem to agree that 
widespread political ignorance is a major obstacle to meaningful de-
mocratic control over government and that the problem is significantly 
exacerbated by the size and scope of the modern state, which imposes 
an enormous knowledge burden on voters.  We also agree that the 
public’s knowledge of The Three Stooges is far more extensive than their 
relatively meager understanding of the Constitution and public policy; 
though Professor Levinson may underestimate the political insights 
that can be gained from watching The Three Stooges.  We continue to 
disagree over the implications of widespread political ignorance for 
efforts to reform the Constitution to make it more democratic. 
In my view, the combination of a crisis atmosphere and wide-
spread political ignorance make it highly likely that any large-scale 
constitutional change in the near future would cause more harm than 
good.  Professor Levinson apparently believes otherwise.  As I hinted 
in my Opening Statement, I think we can expect better results from 
pursuing the more modest agenda of strengthening enforcement of 
limits on government power that are already present in our existing, 
admittedly flawed Constitution.  In the slightly longer term, we might 
also be able to diminish the danger posed by political ignorance by 
pursuing incremental reductions in the size of government.  By no 
means do I counsel “despair,” as Professor Levinson suggests.  Rather, 
I think we can make modest but real progress if we proceed from a re-
alistic understanding of the constraints that we face. 
CAN WE MAKE THE CONSTITUTION MORE DEMOCRATIC WITHOUT 
REDUCING THE SIZE AND SCOPE OF GOVERNMENT? 
In my initial essay, I argued that the size, scope, and complexity of 
modern government make it virtually impossible to impose meaning-
ful democratic control over the state’s operations without reducing its 
size and scope.  Professor Levinson seems to disagree, and suggests 
that we can enhance democracy through other constitutional reforms, 
while keeping government at roughly its current size. 
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Some of the ideas he puts forward have merit.  For example, I 
agree that it would be desirable to eliminate life tenure for Supreme 
Court Justices and replace it with a nonrenewable eighteen-year term 
(though, unlike Levinson, I believe that this reform would require a 
constitutional amendment).  I fail to see, however, how that would 
strengthen democratic control of government.  Term limits for Su-
preme Court Justices would in no way reduce the knowledge burden 
on voters created by the size and scope of the modern state, which 
spends over thirty-seven percent of American GDP every year and 
regulates nearly every aspect of life.  Perhaps Professor Levinson 
merely means to suggest that term limits would enable public opinion 
to have greater leverage over the composition of the Supreme Court, 
because new Justices would be appointed more often.  Maybe so.  But 
the vast scope of modern government has also made the Supreme 
Court’s docket far more complex and varied than it once was.  Few 
voters understand much about the Supreme Court’s work beyond a 
few hot-button issues such as abortion.  Professor Levinson is one of 
many legal scholars who have pointed out that public opinion—as re-
flected in the judicial confirmation process—tends to focus on a small 
subset of the Court’s work that is often less significant than its impact 
on other issues.  As he points out in his Rebuttal, the public has very 
little understanding of constitutional law and the other issues ad-
dressed by the Court.  In fairness, however, even professional legal 
academics (myself included) rarely have sufficient time and incentive 
to acquire extensive knowledge of more than a small portion of the 
work of the modern federal judiciary.  Here, as elsewhere, democratic 
control of government has been weakened by the size and scope of 
the modern state. 
I also support Professor Levinson’s proposal to cut back the 
length of the transition period between the election of a new Presi-
dent and his or her inauguration.  This idea has much to recommend 
it, but it is unlikely to enhance democratic control of government 
more than marginally. 
I don’t have a strong opinion either way about Professor Levin-
son’s third proposed reform:  increasing the size of the Senate from 
two senators per state to three.  Levinson believes that this will in-
crease the average quality of the Senate’s deliberations, and perhaps 
he is correct.  However, the 435-member House of Representatives is 
already almost three times as large as Professor Levinson’s proposed 
150-member Senate and there is little if any evidence that it performs 
significantly better than the Senate as a result.  If Professor Levinson is 
correct about the merits of this proposed reform, it still would not al-
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leviate the loss of democratic control facilitated by the expansion of 
the size and scope of modern government.  Even with a bigger Senate, 
voters would still be electing senators (and representatives) while hav-
ing little or no knowledge of most of the issues that the senators will 
be deciding. 
On the other hand, I do support the more radical version of Pro-
fessor Levinson’s proposal:  altering the composition of the Senate so 
as to eliminate the requirement that each state have the same number 
of senators regardless of its size.  In my view (and Levinson’s), this 
would reduce the massive agricultural subsidies and pork-barrel 
spending that now flow to lightly populated states that have dispropor-
tionate voting power in the Senate.  Unfortunately, however, this pro-
posal has almost no chance of getting enacted as a constitutional 
amendment; the small states that would be harmed by this reform 
have more than enough leverage to block it.  Indeed, Article V of the 
Constitution states that no state “shall be deprived of its equal suffrage 
in the Senate” even if a constitutional amendment mandating that re-
sult does get enacted. 
IMPLICATIONS OF POLITICAL IGNORANCE FOR  
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM EFFORTS 
In my original essay, I pointed out how the combination of wide-
spread political ignorance and a crisis atmosphere greatly increases 
the likelihood that constitutional-reform efforts will yield results that 
make things worse rather than better.  In particular, they make it easy 
for politicians and interest groups to package dangerous changes as 
“emergency measures.”  In past crises, such as the Depression, World 
War II, and the current War on Terror, many harmful policies were 
enacted in precisely this way.  Enacting changes to the Constitution in 
this way might be even more harmful than enacting new statutes or 
executive orders, because constitutional amendments are more diffi-
cult to reverse. 
In his reply, Professor Levinson did not address this part of my ar-
gument.  Perhaps he will do so in his next essay.  In my view, this prob-
lem reduces the likelihood that even efforts to enact beneficial 
changes in the Constitution will bear positive fruit.  They too will have 
to be filtered through a political process infected by fearmongering 
and widespread voter ignorance.  For reasons I laid out in my initial 
essay, the danger is heightened if we circumvent the supermajority re-
quirements of Article V, as Professor Levinson and some other schol-
ars propose to do. 
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I do not believe that these dangers automatically discredit all con-
ceivable efforts at constitutional change during the present crisis.  
They do, however, give us reason for great caution.  At the very least, 
would-be reformers should explain how they intend to enact benefi-
cial reforms while guarding against the effects of fear and political ig-
norance that might deflect their agenda into more harmful directions. 
WHAT IS TO BE DONE? 
I concluded my original essay with this question, but admittedly 
gave only a very brief answer to it.  The problem I identify is not one 
that can be fully addressed in the near future.  However, I am not as 
prone to “despair” as Professor Levinson suggests.  Though it will not 
be easy, we can make some limited but meaningful improvements. 
As noted in my Opening Statement, we can strengthen efforts to 
enforce the limits on government power already present in the text of 
our current, admittedly imperfect, Constitution. Several of the Su-
preme Court decisions that license nearly unlimited government power 
in various spheres rest on narrow five-four or six-three majorities.  Two 
good examples that I have written about extensively are Gonzales v. 
Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (a six-three decision that endorsed unlimited 
congressional authority to regulate virtually anything under the Com-
merce Clause, even though the Clause only gives Congress the power 
to regulate interstate commerce), Ilya Somin, Gonzales v. Raich:  Fed-
eralism as a Casualty of the War on Drugs, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
507 (2006), and Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (a five-
four decision that reiterated previous cases giving government the 
power to condemn property for virtually any reason, despite the Fifth 
Amendment’s requirement that condemnations must be for a “public 
use”), Ilya Somin, Controlling the Grasping Hand:  Economic Development 
Takings After Kelo, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 183 (2007).  It is not impos-
sible for changes in the composition of the Court to lead to the over-
ruling of these cases and others like them.  In recent years, in cases 
such as Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), and Boumediene v. 
Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008), the Supreme Court has begun to restrict 
unbridled wartime executive power.  Similar developments in the 
Court’s jurisprudence on domestic policy issues could also occur.  In-
deed, the case for strict enforcement of constitutional limits on gov-
ernment power is actually stronger in the domestic policy realm, since 
domestic policymaking requires less speed and secrecy. 
In the longer term, we can also find ways to reduce the size and 
scope of government through the political process.  I agree with Pro-
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fessor Levinson that it is unlikely that we can cut government down to 
the relative size it had back in the 1920s.  However, we can potentially 
make it significantly smaller than it is today. Other democracies have 
achieved major reductions in the size and scope of government and 
have been the better for it.  For example, Ireland greatly reduced 
spending, taxation, and regulation during the 1980s and 1990s, as a 
result of which it went from being one of the poorest nations in West-
ern Europe to having a per capita income almost as high as that of the 
United States; Ireland even got to the point where its level of eco-
nomic freedom also roughly equaled our own, despite being far more 
statist before its reforms.  New Zealand achieved similar results during 
the same time period, ironically under a left-of-center Labour Party 
government.  On a lesser, but still significant, scale, our own federal 
government’s spending declined from 22.1% of GDP in 1992 to 
18.4% in 2000 during the Clinton Administration.  OFFICE OF MGMT. 
& BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED 
STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2009, HISTORICAL TABLES 25 
(2008). 
Obviously, significant reductions in the size and scope of Ameri-
can government are unlikely over the next few years.  To the contrary, 
we will almost certainly move in the other direction.  But constitu-
tional scholars must look beyond the immediate future.  As President 
Obama has recognized, we face a looming fiscal crisis that will likely 
increase pressure for reductions in federal spending within the next 
decade.  The current binge of government expansion will not con-
tinue indefinitely. 
Addressing the problems of democracy and political ignorance 
are not the only considerations involved in deciding how large a role 
the state should play in our lives.  If one believes that today’s level of 
government intervention is essential to provide major benefits that 
override the harm caused by loss of democratic control, then so be it.  
But advocates of extensive government should at least provide a co-
herent explanation for why government can be expected to provide 
the promised benefits despite the dangers of political ignorance and 
the absence of meaningful democratic control over its policies.  Rec-
ognizing the dangers of widespread political ignorance need not 
make you a libertarian.  But it should lead you to be more wary of as-
signing broad powers to the state than you might be otherwise.  And if 
we want to make our constitutional republic more democratic, we will 
have to find ways to reduce the overweening power of government 
over society. 
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CLOSING STATEMENT 
Sanford Levinson 
Once again, my thanks to Professor Somin for an interesting and 
thoughtful reply.  I do think that the nub of our dispute comes down 
to the issue of “despair.”  I certainly do not believe that Professor 
Somin “counsels” us to despair in the sense of encouraging such a 
disposition.  Indeed, he is an optimist, not despairing at all about the 
potential for at least alleviating, if not necessarily wholly fixing, the di-
lemma posed by the widespread political ignorance he identifies and 
bewails.  All we have to do is to rein in the powers of government, par-
ticularly, I presume, at the national level.  One suspects that he would 
endorse the general thrust of Richard Epstein’s Simple Rules for a Com-
plex World, in which the first simple rule is, more or less, to say “no” to 
most of what the national government has done at least since the New 
Deal.  I assume as well that he admires, as do I, Randy Barnett’s Restor-
ing the Lost Constitution, perhaps the ablest articulation of a more-or-
less libertarian reading of the Constitution. 
This is not the occasion for a full-scale debate about the merits of 
libertarianism as either a political philosophy or a specific approach to 
the Constitution.  Although I admire Professor Barnett’s book (and, 
for that matter, the intellectual provocations of Richard Epstein), it 
does not mean that I am persuaded.  But the far more important 
point, as suggested in my initial response, is that Professor Somin ba-
sically admits that he is swimming upstream, perhaps against a water-
fall, in arguing that the cure for what ails us as a political order is to 
radically limit the powers of the national government to regulate the 
economy or to provide basic welfare services.  That view was decisively 
rejected in the last election, with consequences that we read about in 
our daily newspapers (or, for an increasing number of people, online). 
Were I a libertarian, I would be in a state of despair at the present 
political situation precisely because it appears so obvious that the cur-
rent political zeitgeist is going in the other direction, where even 
some staunch Republicans find themselves—I believe properly—
endorsing the nationalization of major economic institutions.  Profes-
sor Somin’s nostrum of a diminished role for government is no more 
likely to be generally accepted—at the present time or, I suspect, for 
years to come—than my own nostrum of a new constitutional conven-
tion that would address whether or not our present Constitution, most 
of whose truly important parts were drafted in Philadelphia in 1787, is 
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adequate for our twenty-first-century lives.  From the perspective of 
people who disagree with us, I suspect we are both dismissed—though 
not necessarily by the very same people—as “cranks,” “utopians,” or 
“Don Quixotes” who refuse to accept the world as it is, which is one of 
big (and getting bigger) government and resolute unwillingness to 
think seriously about the adequacy of the Constitution we live under. 
In a forthcoming article to appear in a symposium on the con-
temporary efficacy of Congress within our political structure, The Most 
Disparaged Branch:  The Role of Congress in the Twenty-First Century, 89 
B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2009), I take issue with a suggestion by 
a fellow symposiast, UCLA Professor Barbara Sinclair, that “we need to 
be hard nosed in our analysis and modest about our proposals.”  Bar-
bara Sinclair, Question:  What’s Wrong with Congress?  Answer:  It’s a De-
mocratic Legislature, 89 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2009).  I obvi-
ously agree that it is desirable to “be hard nosed in our analysis”—
what would it mean to embrace “soft nosedness”?—but I disagree 
strongly that this entails that we must be “modest about our propos-
als.”  What links both Professor Somin and me is that, for better and, 
no doubt some would assert, for worse, we firmly believe that we are 
each engaged in hard-nosed thinking about the nature of contempo-
rary politics and that what our noses have smelled leads us to be truly 
“immodest” in our proposals.  For some, of course, this last suggestion 
will evoke Jonathan Swift and his own “immodest proposal” to solve 
the overpopulation problem in Ireland.  I presume that neither Pro-
fessor Somin nor myself believes that we are writing satire.  Each of us 
is completely serious about our analysis and our proposed rectifica-
tions, however much we may disagree with each other. I take great 
comfort, though, in noting Professor Somin’s agreement with some of 
my specific proposals.  Both of us, I take it, are dismayed by the spirit 
of complacence that typifies the legal academy when presented with 
radical critiques and proposals. 
Let me confess that I am genuinely torn about the role that rheto-
rics of “crisis” and “emergency” do, descriptively, and should, norma-
tively, play in the discussion of constitutional reform.  I share his fear 
about the ability particularly of Presidents, charismatic or otherwise, 
to use such rhetoric as a way of amassing power, whether for the na-
tional government in general or the executive branch in particular.  
For many of us, the administration of George W. Bush is, unlike truth 
or beauty, all we know, and all we need to know, about the capacity for 
abusive government and, concomitantly, the importance of adhering 
to the original mantra of the national government being a govern-
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ment “of limited and enumerated powers.”  James Madison, Speech in 
Congress Opposing the National Bank (Feb. 2, 1791), in JAMES MADI-
SON:  WRITINGS 480, 485 ( Jack Rakove ed., 1999).  This explains my 
own admiration for Justice Scalia’s opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 
U.S. 507 (2004), where he unfashionably took the Habeas Corpus 
Clause with genuine seriousness, unlike his more “pragmatic” col-
leagues in the majority.  No doubt there should be a major national 
debate, conducted at the highest possible intellectual level—fat 
chance!—about the implications of the remarkably transformative vi-
sions embraced in President Obama’s first budget and accompanying 
justifications.  That I am exhilarated by having a President who truly 
wants to succeed (and in many ways supplant) FDR and Lyndon John-
son does not mean that the critiques offered by Professor Somin need 
not be fully considered and responded to thoughtfully, with at least 
some instances along the way of concessions to the validity of some of 
those critiques. 
This being said, I think it is also undoubtedly true that dinosaurs 
like the American government change, if at all, only upon the percep-
tion of crisis and emergency.  No doubt many skilled politicians would 
agree with Rahm Emanuel’s now-famous comment that “[y]ou never 
want a serious crisis to go to waste.”  Gerald F. Seib, In Crisis, Opportu-
nity for Obama, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 2008, at A2.  Or perhaps one 
should equally invoke Samuel Johnson’s comment that “when a man 
knows he is to be hanged in a fortnight, it concentrates his mind won-
derfully.”  JAMES BOSWELL, THE LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON 713 (Roger 
Ingpen ed., 1907) (1791).  It is so easy to think of other things when 
one assumes that the future is rosy or even relatively unthreatening.  
The prospect of driving off a cliff, on the other hand, might truly clar-
ify the debate.  The all-important question is whether we can trust po-
litical leaders to identify true crises, as against the stirring up of fear 
attendant on perception of a crisis for rank and partisan political pur-
poses.  Not the least dangerous feature of our political system is that 
Presidents have a great incentive to scare the public, as a means both 
of institutional aggrandizement and helping their political party win 
the next election, which, under our system, is always occurring within 
a maximum of two years. 
The political ignorance that Professor Somin has identified is 
surely one of the explanations for our remarkably coarsened general 
political debate.  As a rabid Democrat, I tend to focus on such figures 
as Sarah Palin, “Joe the Plumber,” and Rush Limbaugh as typifying 
everything that is wrong—perhaps even despair inducing—about our 
present politics.  No doubt Professor Somin would name some people 
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I am more inclined to treat with the same seriousness that all too 
many Republicans treat Palin et al.  What I am confident of is that it is 
possible to engage in serious debate with Professor Somin, Professor 
Epstein, and Professor Barnett, to name only the academics men-
tioned above, without descending into name calling and irredeemable 
cheap shots.  Whether this is enough to overcome despair I leave to 
the reader. 
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